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Abstract The essay aims to show how business ethics—
understood as a three-level approach—can strengthen the
social cohesion of a society, which is jeopardized today in
many ways. In the first part, the purpose of business and the
economy is explained as the creation of wealth defined as a
combination of private and public wealth that includes
natural, economic, human, and social capital. Special
emphasis is placed on the implications of the creation of
public wealth which requires institutions other than the
market and motivations other than self-regarding ones. In
the second part, the question of what holds a society
together is discussed through different approaches:
enlightened self-interest, a new game-theoretical approach,
and the concept of the common good advanced by Catholic
Social Teaching, followed by my own proposal. The third
part presents several perspectives for business ethics to
strengthen social cohesion of a society (a) by focusing on
the purpose of business and the economy to create natural,
economic, human, and social capital; (b) by advancing
public goods that stand the test of ethical scrutiny; and
(c) by securing human rights conceptualized as public
goods.
Keywords Business ethics  Capital (natural, economic,
human, social)  Human rights  Potential and limitations of
market institutions  Self- and other-regarding motivations 
Public goods  Social cohesion  Wealth creation
For the social cohesion of a society, the so-called ‘‘public
goods’’ are of vital importance. This is the topic to be
explored in this essay. The question about what holds a
society together is, without any doubt, extraordinarily
complex. It is posed with great urgency when we believe that
social cohesion is jeopardized or even is in the process of
falling apart. We can identify these crisis experiences at
different social levels. In our city or community, we are
perhaps incapable of fixing infrastructures which are falling
into disrepair or overcoming extreme social inequalities. In
our country, we are not able to secure a decent livelihood for
ethnic and religious minorities. In the European Union, we
cannot find a common ground to address the challenges of
refugees from the Middle East. And worldwide the necessary
cohesion is lacking for commitment to effective policies
against the threat of climate change.
These examples illustrate with clarity that we are faced with
a huge number of problems—political, economic, sociologi-
cal, psychological, legal, moral, and others. They are con-
nected to each other and can be found in many societies and on
different levels—from the local to the global level.
The social cohesion of a society is a daunting problem of
enormous complexity and significance. We do not have to be
alarmist in order to realistically perceive and urgently warn
about the endangerment to and crumbling of social cohesion.
The problem is far more comprehensive than we could solve
from a business ethics perspective. Nevertheless, within its
limitations, business ethics is challenged to face this problem:
How can it strengthen the social cohesion of a society?
To address this question, I begin with defining the key
terms of social cohesion and business ethics in the following
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way. Social cohesion is understood—according to Dick
Stanley—as ‘‘the willingness of members of a society to
cooperate with each other in order to survive and prosper.
Willingness to cooperate means they freely choose to form
partnerships and to have a reasonable chance of realizing
goals, because others are willing to cooperate and share the
fruits of their endeavours equitably’’ (Stanley 2003, p. 5).
This definition may suffice for time being and will be dis-
cussed later on in this essay.
The second term, business ethics, stands for business and
economic ethics and is meant in a comprehensive and differ-
entiated sense, as it has evolved in recent years under the
influence of globalization. It covers the whole sphere of eco-
nomic life from the ethical perspective and includes both the
theoretical elucidation (academic discipline) and the practical
implementation (sound practices of business at all levels). In
line with Henk van Luijk’s definition (van Luijk 1997, p. 1579)
widely accepted by the European Business Ethics Network and
beyond (Rossouw and Stu¨ckelberger 2011), the fundamental
task of business ethics is to enhance the ethical quality of
decision making and action at all levels of business: at the
personal (micro-), organizational (meso-), and systemic
(macro-) levels. When facing complex issues, business ethics
has to adopt a multilevel approach and account for the free-
doms and constraints at each of these levels as well as for the
interrelationships between these levels.
With this clarification in mind, the essay proceeds in three
steps. First, we focus on the purpose of business and the
economy. I propose to define it as the creation of wealth in a
comprehensive sense, combining private and public wealth
and encompassing natural, economic, human, and social cap-
ital. Second, we widen our perspective to society at large and
ask for an appropriate concept and foundation of social cohe-
sion. Different approaches are discussed: enlightened self-in-
terest, a new game-theoretical approach, and the concept of the
common good advanced by Catholic Social Teaching, fol-
lowed by my own approach that emphasizes the importance of
public goods. Third, based on the understanding of wealth
creation cited above, I offer three ways in which business ethics
can strengthen the social cohesion of a society (a) by focusing
on the purpose of business and the economy to create natural,
economic, human, and social capital; (b) by advancing public
goods that stand the test of ethical scrutiny; and (c) by securing
human rights conceptualized as public goods.
The Purpose of Business and the Economy: The
Creation of Wealth as a Combination of Private
and Public Wealth
On facing the multiple challenges of globalization, finan-
cialization, and threatening environmental catastrophes, it
is urgently necessary to ask about the purpose of business
and the economy and to examine different notions of
wealth. What is meant by wealth is often very simple—the
equivalent of ‘‘a ton of money’’—and the purpose of
business and the economy is said to be ‘‘to make as much
money as possible.’’ Or the purpose is defined very
vaguely—for example, as ‘‘creating value’’—so that it is
interpreted in multiple and contradictory ways. Therefore,
it seems appropriate to investigate the questions of the
purpose of business and the economy and the concept of
wealth in both a critical and a constructive way.
The concept of wealth carries multifaceted meanings.
As Robert Heilbroner (1987, p. 880) writes, ‘‘wealth is a
fundamental concept in economics indeed, perhaps the
conceptual starting point for the discipline. Despite its
centrality, however, the concept of wealth has never been a
matter of general consensus.’’ Concerning the concept
itself, it figures prominently in Adam Smith’s book, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations (1776/1976), but is conspicuously absent from
Gunnar Myrdal‘s book, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the
Poverty of Nations (1968) and is complemented with its
opposite in David Landes’s book, The Wealth and Poverty
of Nations. Why Some Are So Rich and Some Are So Poor
(1999).
In order to explore and examine the concepts of wealth,
we first may concentrate on what is meant by the wealth of
a single nation. What makes a country like Norway ‘‘a rich
country’’?1 Recent studies of the World Bank, the OECD
and other institutions produced interesting results, which
correct the common fixation on the Gross Domestic Pro-
duct (GDP) as the decisive and often only indicator of the
economic situation of a country. These publications
develop a much richer and more realistic understanding of
the wealth of a country (see World Bank 2006, 2011;
Warsh 2006; Stiglitz et al. 2009; UNDP 2010; OECD
2013).
Drawing from this rich literature, a normative purpose
of business is proposed and briefly characterized, while
referring to an extensive discussion by the author in
numerous articles (Enderle 2009, 2010, 2013, 2015a, b).
The Wealth of a Society is a Combination of Private
and Public Wealth
When we undertake to define ‘‘the wealth of a nation,’’ it is
difficult to deny that wealth should encompass both private
and public goods or assets, that is, endowments of two
types: those that can be attributed to and controlled by
individual actors, be they persons, groups, or organizations,
and those from which no actor inside the nation can be
1 Norway ranks as the richest country in the world in 2005, according
to World Bank (2011).
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excluded. In economic theory, ‘‘public goods’’ are defined
with the characteristics of non-exclusivity and non-rivalry
(see Musgrave 1958; Samuelson 1954, 1955). A classic
example is national defense (in a democratic setting).
When it is established, no one can be excluded from it.
Moreover, one person can benefit from it without reducing
the benefit of it for another person; in other words, the
‘‘consumption’’ or ‘‘enjoyment’’ of one person does not
rival the ‘‘consumption’’ or ‘‘enjoyment’’ of another per-
son. In contrast, a private good is characterized by the
attributes of exclusivity and rivalry.
These two formal criteria of the public good apply also
to a negative public good, or as it can be called ‘‘public
bad.’’2 When a region is struck by an epidemic disease (like
Ebola), no one can (in principle) be excluded, and the risk
of infection for one inhabitant of that ravaged region does
not reduce the risk of infection of another inhabitant. (On
the contrary, it might even reinforce the risk for the other
person).
Of course, this brief characterization of private and
public goods needs more explication, which I will provide
later on. At this point, it is important to understand that the
wealth of a society, ranging from the local up to the global
level, be conceived as a combination of private and public
wealth—not just as an aggregation of private wealth. This
means that the creation of private goods depends on the
availability of public goods, and, in turn, the creation of
public goods is dependent on the availability of private
goods.
To illustrate this thesis, I would like to mention an
example from China’s recent history. When, in 1978 after
the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping launched the
economic reform and opening-up of the country, the Chi-
nese people were called upon ‘‘to jump into the sea’’ (xia`
ha˘i), that is, to leave the security of state-owned enterprises
and run the risk of opening and operating their own busi-
nesses. In the following decades, the introduction of the
market economy has proven, by and large, to be very
successful (which, of course, does not deny the downsides
of this economic development). A decisive factor of suc-
cess was the so-called ‘‘Deng Xiaoping effect’’ (Yasheng
Huang). Although no well-established rule of law to protect
private entrepreneurs existed, the Chinese trusted that Deng
Xiaoping would not deceive them, but rather that he would
acknowledge and support their efforts. Thus, it is fair to
conclude that the existing public good of trust in Deng
Xiaoping was a crucial factor of success for private
entrepreneurial initiatives in China’s economic reform.
On the other hand, it also holds true that the creation of
public goods depends on the creation of private goods. It
suffices to recall the multifaceted private contributions to
the creation of public wealth, which are provided in busi-
ness, education, research and development, arts, health
care, in the form of taxes and in many other areas.
Hence, understanding the wealth of a society as a
combination of private and public wealth, some basic
assumptions are implied. I would like to highlight two
assumptions with far-reaching implications. First, we know
that the institution of the market is, by and large, pretty
efficient in creating private goods—that is, after all, why
Deng Xiaoping introduced a kind of market economy in
China. We also know from economic theory that a market
will fail in creating public goods. Although many public
goods have a material side, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to put prices on them in order to make supply
and demand function properly. As a consequence, other-
than-market institutions are needed for the creation of
public goods. It is well known that Elinor Ostrom devel-
oped other institutional forms in order to solve ‘‘the tragedy
of the commons’’ (pointed out by Garrett Hardin in 1968),
for which she received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sci-
ences in 2009.
The second basic assumption implied in the thesis of the
wealth of a society as a combination of private and public
wealth concerns motivations: self-interest cannot but fail
when it comes to the creation of public wealth. Why?
Whoever is engaged in creating public goods cannot
expect, realistically speaking, a reward equivalent to the
time and effort put into such engagement. In many cases,
one has to accept or at least put up with sacrifices in one
form or another. Strictly guided by self-interest alone (as
advocated, for example, by the Russian-American
philosopher Ayn Rand3), one can support or tolerate the
interests of other people only to the extent that they do not
conflict with one’s own interest. Therefore, in order to
create public goods, another kind of motivation is neces-
sary that takes the interests of other persons, groups,
organizations, states, and other entities at least as seriously
as one’s own interest. As economic history shows, moti-
vations can take a huge variety of forms such as selfless
engagement for entrepreneurial success, love for the
mother country, solidarity with the poor, and the fight for a
lost cause. In each case, the other-regarding motivation
transcends self-interest, be it for a good or for a bad cause.
2 The term public bad is used in economics as the symmetric of the
term public good because of its characteristics of non-exclusivity and
non-rivalry and its negative impact on people and nature. Air
pollution is an obvious example of a public bad. For current
definitions of public bads, see Kolstad (2010).
3 Ayn Rand inspired Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve of the United States (1987–2006), over several decades until
his hearing in the U.S. Senate on October 23, 2008 when he admitted:
‘‘I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations,
specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of
protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms’’
(quoted by Knowlton and Grynbaum 2008).
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Therefore, other-regarding motivation is a necessary,
though not a sufficient, reason for creating public goods,
and ethical evaluation is still required for creating positive
public goods. When global public goods or bads are at
stake (like in the case of climate change), other-regarding
motivations are especially difficult to mobilize. One may,
therefore, expect the world’s religions to help strengthen
the motivations for (positive) global public goods (Enderle
2000).
The Wealth of a Society Encompasses Natural,
Economic, Human, and Social Capital
After discussing the formal criteria of private and public goods,
we now turn to the substantive determination of wealth. In
doing so, I use some concepts of economic theory which may
sound a bit strange to non-economists—concepts such as
capital, consumption, investment, and opportunity costs.
These concepts can help to capture complex problems more
precisely without yielding to a kind of economic imperialism.
In line with the OECD report How’s Life? 2013. Mea-
suring Well-Being (2013), I propose to define the wealth of
a society—for example, of a country—as the total amount
of economically relevant private and public assets includ-
ing natural capital, economic capital, human capital, and
social capital. Natural capital consists of the natural
resources minus environmental burdens.4 Economic capital
is composed of ‘‘real’’ and financial capital. Human capital
stands for human beings’ health and education. Finally,
social capital—as trust relations according to Robert Put-
nam—indicates the level of trust between human beings.5
This definition of wealth (that is close to the meaning of
well-being) involves important characteristics emphasized
by the OECD report (2013) as well.6 First, not only eco-
nomic capital but also natural, human, and social capital
are of economic relevance. However, this does not mean
that they are only important in economic terms; rather, they
can be intrinsically valuable as well. Consequently, public
goods can be relevant not only for wealth creation but also
for other non-economic purposes.
Second, this definition of wealth includes human beings
as well as things and environmental conditions which
matter to human beings. Thus, it goes beyond the common,
material definition of wealth by taking seriously ‘‘human
capabilities’’ (according to Amartya Sen) and placing
human well-being on the center stage. The definition dif-
fers, though, from the definition of human development by
the United Nations Development Programme, which seems
to identify the ‘‘real wealth of nations’’ only in human
beings (and not also things and nature important for human
beings). In a nutshell, the definition proposed here aims at
taking seriously and expressing the bodiliness of human
beings.
Third, as in the report of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi
Commission (2009) and in the OECD report (2013), the
concept of capital refers to stocks and flows, embracing not
only economically relevant stocks of capital at a certain
point in time but also changes of capital stocks over a
certain period of time. In this way, one takes into account,
for example, both wealth and income, and both stocks of
natural resources and changes thereof.
As these conceptual considerations show, a thorough
and well thought-out concept of wealth is of extraordinary
significance. Some important aspects have been explained;
others cannot be addressed in this essay, but are discussed
elsewhere (see author’s references). An especially
intriguing topic for further exploration beyond this essay is
the study of poverty and economic inequality in light of
this comprehensive notion of private and public wealth.
Already in his day, Adam Smith saw in the creation of
wealth the purpose of business and the economy. Today,
we can define the purpose in significantly broader and
richer terms. It goes without saying that only a minority of
the population and only a few responsible leaders in sci-
ence and politics probably share this notion. However,
despite its significance, it should not be overvalued. It is
always embedded in the societal context where other
equally or even more important purposes matter: demo-
cratic control of power, responsible promotion of
4 The important concept of natural capital has been emphasized by
The Natural Capital Declaration, a commitment of the finance sector
for Rio?20 and beyond. It defines natural capital as Earth’s natural
assets (soil, air, water, flora, and fauna), and the ecosystem services
resulting from them, which make human life possible. The signatories
of the declaration wish to demonstrate their commitment to the
eventual integration of natural capital considerations into private
sector reporting, accounting, and decision making, with standardiza-
tion of measurement and disclosure of natural capital use by the
private sector (www.naturalcapitaldeclaration.org).
5 There are a great many concepts of social capital at multiple levels
of human relations (see, for example, Ayios et al. (2014); Kwon and
Adler 2014). After reviewing over 90 books and articles, Kwon and
Adler conclude: ‘‘The basic thesis—that the social ties can be
efficacious in providing information, influence, and solidarity—is no
longer in dispute’’ (p. 419). In this essay, I concentrate on
economically relevant social capital and use Robert Putnam’s
definition which refers to ‘‘connections among individuals—social
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise
from them’’ (Putnam 2000, p. 19). Social capital can be simultane-
ously a private good and a public good and can have ‘‘a dark side’’
(meaning restricting freedom and encouraging intolerance), which is
examined from an ethics perspective by Ayios et al. (2014). Thus, the
definition of social capital used in this essay differs from the concept
of social cohesion, as becomes clear in the following section.
6 Similarly, the International Integrated Reporting Committee distin-
guishes six types of capital: financial, manufactured, intellectual,




knowledge and arts, careful dealing with nature, and other
purposes.
What Holds a Society Together?
Having determined more precisely the purpose of business
and the economy as the creation of wealth, we now focus
on the question how the social cohesion of a society can
best be conceptualized. The question is not new; but in
recent years it has solicited a great deal of discussion. This
should not come as a surprise when we realize the enor-
mous pressure of globalization on our societies and their
pluralistic fragmentation. Early on, John Rawls urged, in A
Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993),
that our pluralistic (democratic) societies needed an
‘‘overlapping consensus,’’ or a common ethical ground, if
they were to be stable. The Institute for Social Ethics of the
Swiss Federation of Protestant Churches celebrated its 25th
anniversary in 1996 with a conference on ‘‘Social cohe-
sion—Put into question’’ (Voye´ et al. 1998). A few years
ago, the Rottendorf Foundation at the Munich School of
Philosophy of the Jesuits invited scholars to a symposium
on ‘‘What holds a society together? The jeopardized deal-
ing with pluralism’’ (Reder et al. 2013). And the new book
by Christoph Luetge (2015) has the title Order Ethics or
Moral Surplus. What Holds a Society Together?
There is a great variety of concepts related to social
cohesion, particularly in the literature of sociology, while
the term itself is much less frequently used in the literature
of political philosophy and business ethics.7 The OECD
report (2011) defines social cohesion in a very broad sense:
‘‘A society is ‘cohesive’ if it works towards the well-being
of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalization,
creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its
members the opportunity of upward social mobility’’
(OECD 2011, p. 51). Social cohesion consists of three
different, equally important components: (a) social inclu-
sion (measured by such aspects of social exclusion as
poverty, inequality and social polarization); (b) social
capital (combining measures of trust—interpersonal and
societal—with various forms of civic engagement; and
(c) social mobility (measuring the degree to which people
can or believe they can change their position in society).
Influenced by numerous reports of international organiza-
tions, this definition, while rather comprehensive, in my
view, lacks precision and consistency.
Dick Stanley presents a fine and differentiated discus-
sion of the concept and model of social cohesion as it has
unfolded in the Canadian government’s Social Cohesion
Research Network:
Social cohesion is defined as the willingness of
members of a society to cooperate with each other in
order to survive and prosper. Willingness to cooper-
ate means they bqfreely choose to form partnerships
and to have a reasonable chance of realizing goals,
because others are willing to cooperate and share the
fruits of their endeavours equitably. (Stanley 2003,
p. 5)
This concept contains three key components. First, the
willingness and capacity of people to cooperate with each
other in the diversity of collective enterprises that members
of a society must do in order to survive and prosper. It also
implies a willingness on the part of partners to share the
fruits of their cooperation fairly. As cooperation takes place
at all levels of social activity, social cohesion is the sum
over a population of individuals’ willingness to cooperate.
Second, social cohesion should not be confused with social
order, common values, or communities of interpretation
because they can also be achieved in an authoritarian
society or a beleaguered community through coercion and
exclusion, out of fear or hatred without free choice of the
members. Third, there is an affinity between social
cohesion and liberal social values such as freedom,
equality, tolerance, respect for diversity, and human rights.
Social cohesion guided by liberal social values engenders
fair social outcomes, which, in turn, strengthens social
cohesion.
This concept of social cohesion appears to be particu-
larly appropriate from the perspective of business ethics
and moral responsibility. According to De George (2010,
chapter 6), acting in a morally responsible manner means
to be capable of acting (causing the result of action) and to
do it knowingly and willingly; in other words, it means not
to be forced to do it, to have a choice, to know what one is
doing, and to do it deliberately.
Based on Stanley’s concept of social cohesion, we now
discuss different approaches of its foundation. The first
approach deals with the individualistic model of the neo-
classical economic theory that is also used in the so-called
order ethics. The second, game-theoretical approach goes
beyond the neoclassical model and opens up promising
new perspectives, which can rectify the weaknesses of the
individualistic model. The third approach portrays the
concept of the common good advanced by Catholic Social
Teaching. Finally, I explain more extensively why public
7 See above references and literature cited in Stanley (2003) and
OECD (2011). The term social cohesion is absent in the indices of
Lexikon der Wirtschaftsethik [German Encyclopedia of Business
Ethics, 1993], A Companion to Business Ethics (1999), The Blackwell
Companion to Philosophy (2003), Encyclopedia of Ethics (2001), The
Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management. Second Edition. Business
Ethics (2005), Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society, The
Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (2008), Hand-
book of Research on Global Corporate Citizenship (2008), and The
Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics (2010).
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goods are of decisive importance for the social cohesion of
a society.
Is Enlightened Self-interest on Its Own a Solid
Foundation?
In the neoclassical economic theory, rationality and the
motivation for economic activities are characterized with
the notions of the ‘‘homo oeconomicus’’ and its intellectual
descendant ‘‘REMM’’ (resourceful, evaluative, maximizing
man) (Kaufmann 1988, pp. 244 ff.; see also Luetge 2013,
pp. 251–335). The economic actors (households, firms) act
rationally if they maximize their own utility or profit,
respectively. This concept of rationality is based on action
theory by focusing on various options for action, while the
conditions of actions are assumed to be relatively stable. It
presupposes methodological individualism that traces all
actions back to individual decisions (of households and
firms). As Franz-Xavier Kaufmann writes in the
Handwo¨rterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (HdWW),
the homo oeconomicus can take three different meanings:
(1) It is a real-typical reconstruction of empirical economic
behavior. (2) It defines the norm of rational economic
behavior. (3) It is the analytical starting point for decision-
theoretical calculations.
Accordingly, the critique of the homo oeconomicus can
be threefold: (1) The concept is a bad real-typical
reconstruction and can be refuted in multiple ways (which
has been undertaken by behavioral economics). (2) The
norm is questionable because it can hardly be justified by
reasoning. (3) The analytical method is of little explica-
tive value.
In addition to these criticisms, methodological individ-
ualism can be put into question because the relevance of
collective actors is left out of account or even contested.
The action-theoretical approach has difficulty capturing
clearly the changing conditions of action. The time horizon
in which the maximization has to take place is difficult to
determine. Finally, the aggregation of the utilities of indi-
vidual actors to a ‘‘social welfare function’’ is practically
not possible, as many years ago Kenneth Arrow demon-
strated in his famous book Social Choice and Individual
Values (Arrow 1951/1963).
Despite all these problems, it is astonishing how much
the homo oeconomicus has not only survived but even
flourished in economic sciences and beyond. How can this
construct—in spite of all this questionableness—provide a
solid foundation that holds a society together?
A partial rescue attempt of the homo oeconomicus has
been undertaken by Karl Homann and recently by Luetge
(2015). They acknowledge the criticism that the homo
oeconomicus fails if it is understood in the real-typical and
normative sense (points 1 and 2). However, they maintain
that this construct is appropriate and can be useful for
analyzing certain problems (point 3). Luetge advocates the
thesis that the homo oeconomicus provides a solid foun-
dation for addressing the problem of a basic order of
society, that is, an ‘‘order ethics.’’ The attitudes and
behaviors guided by enlightened self-interest would indeed
hold a society together in the global and pluralistic context
(Luetge 2015, especially pp. 176–177).
Luetge develops his provocative thesis in careful steps
and in discussions with a number of noted philosophers.
Unfortunately, I cannot present my comment here; but, at
least, I would like to briefly indicate my criticism, which
primarily presents two reasons that speak against his thesis.
First, methodological individualism is based on an indi-
vidualistic and western anthropology, which does not take
collective phenomena seriously in an adequate manner.
Second, this approach fails when we consider the kind of
goods that are at stake. Social cohesion of a society is a
central public good. Therefore, its creation and mainte-
nance cannot be motivated—as explained above—by mere
self-interest, even if it is enlightened. Required are also
other-regarding motivations, which take seriously the
interests of the society as a whole.
In order to overcome the approach based on self-interest
alone, Juljan Krause and Markus Scholz propose a team-
oriented model rooted in game theory (Krause and Scholz
2016). The game-theoretical model aims at capturing the
key problems in negotiations among many stakeholders for
common, above all, global standards. The actors can switch
between two types of reasoning—the I-modus and the We-
modus. The kind of agreement is influenced by the extent
to which the actors are willing to argue from the standpoint
of the group. In my view, this model presents a promising
approach for better understanding of the creation of public
goods.
How Solid is the Concept of the Common Good
in Catholic Social Teaching?
The common good is a key concept in Catholic Social
Teaching and involves various connotations. An important
definition can be found in the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World ‘‘Gaudium et Spes’’ (1965,
no. 26):
[The common good] is the sum of those conditions of
social life which allow social groups and their indi-
vidual members relatively thorough and ready access
to their own fulfillment … [T]oday [it] takes on an
increasingly universal complexion and consequently
bqinvolves rights and duties with respect to the whole
human race. Every social group must take account of
the needs and legitimate aspirations of other groups,
G. Enderle
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and even of the general welfare of the entire human
family.
Four aspects of this definition deserve to be emphasized
particularly: First, the common good pertains to the
conditions of social (or societal) life, not to the substantive
goal of all people in society (described in German as
‘‘Gemeingut’’). Therefore, the common good is an instru-
mental value (‘‘Dienstwert’’), not an intrinsic value
(‘‘Selbstwert’’) (see Brieskorn 2010, p. 157). Second, these
conditions are necessary for both social groups and their
individual members in order to achieve their respective life
plans (‘‘their own fulfillment’’). Third, the common good
encompasses the totality of those social conditions. Fourth,
because of globalization (i.e., the increasingly close
interdependence worldwide), all these conditions concern
all humankind.
How are these social conditions defined in substantive
terms? Based on the encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963) by
John XXIII and confirmed by the Second Vatican Council,
these conditions encompass all human rights as promul-
gated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948 and specified in the International Covenants and
Conventions of the United Nations. With unequivocal
clarity, Catholic Social Teaching today affirms the totality
of human rights as defined above, although many Catholics
and people outside the Catholic church are not aware of
this fact or do not want to note or live up to it.
Given this concept of the common good, we now ask
what it implies for our question regarding the social
cohesion of a society. In contrast to the anthropological
assumption of the homo oeconomicus, Catholic Social
Teaching makes the assumption that humans are relational
beings. Relations to other human beings are constitutive for
the identity of the person, prominently asserted by the
Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes (No. 12): ‘‘[For] by
his innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he
relates himself to others he can neither live nor develop his
potential.’’ This basic anthropological assumption forms
the foundation for social cohesion of any society and
excludes both individualistic and collectivistic conceptions.
Therefore, motivations exclusively driven by self-interest,
even if it is enlightened, are incompatible with the rela-
tionality of human beings. It goes without saying that
people can and often do act by disregarding or violating
their relationality.
As stated above, the common good defines the condi-
tions under which social groups and their individual
members should be able to pursue their life plans. They
hold for every society from the local to the global level and
consist, to a significant extent, of human rights. Having
said this, still two important questions remain: First, to be
more precise, what kinds of society do we have in mind?
And second, of what kinds of goods are these conditions
composed?
As one may suspect, I propose to conceptualize the
social conditions as combinations of private and public
goods. Having done so, it will be easier to determine more
precisely the society or the societies to be considered.
The Creation and Maintenance of Public Goods
Provide a Solid Foundation for the Social Cohesion
of a Society
As explained above, public goods are defined with the
characteristics of non-exclusivity and non-rivalry. In order
to create and maintain them, collective actors are neces-
sary, who are guided by motivations that take the interests
of other persons and social actors seriously at least to the
extent that they account for their own interests.
At this point, some further clarification of the concept of
public goods is in order. In particular, I mention three
aspects: First, while private and public goods can be dis-
tinguished with great clarity thanks to the characteristics of
non-exclusivity and non-rivalry, many mixed forms can
occur between these two poles—according to the degrees
of exclusivity and rivalry. To illustrate, the software pro-
gram may be of minimal rivalry because its use by one
engineer hardly affects the program when used by another
engineer. However, the legal protection of intellectual
property prevents outsiders from using the program.
Another example is ‘‘the tragedy of the commons’’: If no
cattle are excluded from grazing on the commons, a large
number of cattle may ruin the pasture despite the small
rival consumption of each individual cow.
Second, there exists a large variety of public goods
which are not limited to given political, social, cultural, or
other boundaries. For example, the impact of a nuclear
power plant situated at a national border reaches far into
the neighboring country. The criterion of the extension of a
public good is the extension of its impact on people and
nature.
Third, the formal definition of the public good implies
that it can be ‘‘good’’ (positive) or ‘‘bad’’ (negative).8 To
illustrate, a stable, efficient, fair, and reliable financial
system is valued as positive, while an unstable, inefficient,
8 Examples of positive public goods are physical infrastructure,
access to vital information (transparency), rule of law, basic health
care and education, social capital (trust in interpersonal relations and
social institutions), human rights (civil, political, economic, social,
cultural), relatively corruption-free business practices, relatively
conflict-free (peaceful) environments, safety in the transportation
system, liberal prerequisites for innovation, etc.
Examples for negative public goods (‘‘public bads’’) are multiple
forms of environmental degradation, corruption, military conflicts,
epidemics, dysfunctional governments, decay of infrastructure, etc.
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unfair, and unreliable system is considered a ‘‘public bad.’’
This dual-sidedness of public goods, which, of course is
often not so straightforward, prompts or even forces those
affected by the public good/bad (or the representative of
those affected) to take a stand and make a decision—fig-
uratively speaking, because they are sitting in the same
boat. Not only the benefits of a positive public good but
also its opportunity costs must be taken into account. This
dual-sidedness is a challenge and an opportunity to
strengthen the social cohesion of a society with the help of
providing public goods and preventing public bads. An
interesting perspective for further research is the question
how Catholic Social Teaching with its principles of soli-
darity and subsidiarity can provide valuable guidance for
identifying and addressing issues of public goods.
How Business Ethics Can Strengthen the Social
Cohesion of a Society
After considering the purpose of business and the economy
and the significance of public goods for wealth creation,
the answer to the initial question of this essay unsurpris-
ingly arises—at least in brief outline and with conceptual
clarification. The most important answer, of course, must
be given in practice.
We have defined the purpose of business and the
economy as the creation of wealth in a comprehensive
sense. It encompasses all economically relevant private and
public assets including natural, economic, human, and
social capital. It is, therefore, by far more substantive than
the maximization of profit and much more precise than the
so-called ‘‘creation of values.’’ The significance of public
goods for public wealth has been particularly highlighted
because, in our public debates today, the comprehension of
these truly public affairs is getting lost, which threatens and
undermines the social cohesion of societies. This danger-
ous development is especially threatening given the enor-
mous challenges of globalization.
Business ethics, however, while exposed to these chal-
lenges, is not without help. It can strengthen the social
cohesion of a society from the local to the global level in
multiple ways. I identify the following three sets of
opportunities and tasks: regarding the substantive notion of
wealth, the formal concept of public wealth, and the
comprehension of human rights as public goods.9
Creating Natural, Economic, Human, and Social
Capital
As the OECD report on well-being (2013) explains, the
sustainability of well-being over time requires preserving
all four types of capital while taking into account the dis-
tribution of these capitals among the population. Business
ethics should take inspiration from this valuable frame-
work, persistently raising the question of the purpose of
business and the economy in economic sciences as well as
in business and economic practice and offering well
thought-out answers at all levels of action: at the individ-
ual, organizational, and systemic levels. At stake is the
‘‘creation’’ of wealth, which means making something new
and better—in other words, it is about ‘‘ethical innovation
in business and the economy’’ (see Enderle and Murphy
2016). More specifically, ethical innovation pertains to
each type of capital:
• The creation of natural capital—consuming less natural
resources and burdening less of the environment—has
to be taken seriously, with great consistency at the level
of individual actors such as consumers; at the level of
enterprises, investment firms, and consumer organiza-
tions; and at the systemic level where, driven by a
culture of sustainability, environmental laws and reg-
ulations are to be set up and implemented.
• The creation of economic capital requires—among
many other challenges—the reintegration of the finan-
cial services sector into the real economy in order to
play (again) a serving role in the creation of wealth in a
comprehensive sense.
• As for the creation of human capital, the health care
and the educational systems should not be considered to
be primarily huge national expenditures. Rather, they
should be treated as efficient investments in people for
the enhancement of their health and education.
• Creating social capital means strengthening and
expanding trust in interpersonal relations through
honest business behavior, which, at the same time,
needs to be secured by fair and efficient institutions.
Fostering the Comprehension of Public Wealth
Business ethics should systematically develop and explain
the central importance of public wealth and demonstrate its
relevance for the creation of natural, economic, human, and
social capital.
• The concept of public goods should be clarified and
deepened for a better understanding of public wealth.
The structural presuppositions and consequences
implied in this concept are to be openly explored and
9 These perspectives, along with active involvement of the world’s
religions, are further developed in Enderle (2011).
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explained. The institutions and motivations necessary
for the creation of public goods deserve extensive
discussion.
• Because the definition of public goods is of a formal
nature—defined by non-exclusivity and non-rivalry—
ethical evaluation is indispensable. ‘‘Good’’ and ‘‘bad’’
public goods should be distinguishable.
• Because wealth of a society is conceived as a combi-
nation of private and public wealth, it is crucial to
understand their mutual dependence and to strike a
reasonable balance between both. The potential and the
limitations of both basic institutions need to be clarified
and examined of the market required for the creation of
private wealth and of the collective actors necessary for
the creation of public wealth—ranging from the local to
the global level.
Conceptualizing and Securing Human Rights
as Public Goods
In order to strengthen the social cohesion of a society,
business ethics, generally speaking, is called to help create
wealth in a comprehensive sense while particularly
advancing public wealth. More specifically, I propose to
conceptualize human rights as ‘‘good’’—ethically bind-
ing—public goods.
The special focus on human rights is suggested for several
reasons. In the process of globalization, economies and
businesses have expanded far beyond national borders and
increasingly been connected both internationally and glob-
ally. Through this process, the realm of not only private but
also public goods has been enlarged dramatically. With this
expansion comes a growing need for universal normative
standards for businesses and economies. Since the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the ethical (and legal)
framework of human rights has developed to a widely
accepted, though not undisputed, universal ethical frame-
work that has no comparable alternatives. Moreover, in the
new millennium, the global concern for business and human
rights has considerably strengthened.
With the United Nations Framework and its Guiding
Principles for business and human rights, developed under
the leadership of John Ruggie from 2005 to 2011, human
rights have become a clearly defined global standard for
corporate responsibility, that is, for business ethics at the
organizational level. (Of course, this does not exempt states
and other actors at different levels from their respective
responsibilities.) Based on numerous international cove-
nants and conventions supported through many worldwide
consultations by the Ruggie team with businesses, civil
society organizations, other organizations and experts from
many fields, 30 human rights have been identified as relevant
for business (UN 2008): civil, political, economic, social,
and cultural rights, including the right to development. In
2011, the United Nations released the UN Guiding Principles
for Business and Human Rights (UN 2011), which since
seem to have gathered increasing momentum. These devel-
opments and their recent impact are reported in the excellent
account in Ruggie’s book, Just Business (2013).
My proposal is to conceptualize these 30 human rights
as ‘‘good’’ public goods, which, after the considerations
presented in this essay, might be rather easy. Non-exclu-
sivity means that no single human being should be exclu-
ded from any human right. In other words, all human
beings should be able to enjoy all human rights. Non-ri-
valry implies that the enjoyment of any human right by one
person should not diminish the enjoyment of this right by
another person and that the enjoyment of different human
rights should not compete with each other. In other words,
no trade-offs between human rights are acceptable. For
example, the right to political participation should not
impair the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion, nor vice versa; or the freedom of association
should not negatively affect the right to non-discrimination,
nor vice versa.
Beyond the exclusion of negative impact, one can argue
that the enjoyment of any human right by oneself or any
person may be independent from the enjoyment of other
rights. For example, the right to freedom of movement may
not affect the right to freedom from torture. Furthermore,
the enjoyment of one right may even reinforce the enjoy-
ment of another right. For instance, the right to an adequate
standard of living (including food, clothing, housing, and a
minimal income) and the rights to work and education can
strengthen each other.
The definition of human rights as ethically demanded public
goods obviously has far-reaching implications for the states
and intergovernmental organizations because collective
actions at multiple levels are required (which is a broad topic
area beyond the scope of this essay). For now, three implica-
tions are briefly outlined that pertain to ‘‘corporate responsi-
bility’’ as defined by the UN Guiding Principles.10 First,
transnational corporations and other business enterprises are
‘‘responsible to respect human rights’’ and to help ‘‘remedy
human rights violations,’’ but not ‘‘to protect human rights’’
which is the ‘‘duty’’ of states. In other words, corporations have
to contribute to this kind of public goods, in addition to pro-
ducing private goods. Second, contributing to public goods
necessitates a motivation that transcends the self-interest of
corporations and includes other-regarding motives. There is no
pre-established harmony that would coordinate exclusively
self-regarding behaviors in order to produce public goods in
10 For an extensive discussion of the UN Framework on Business and
Human Rights and its Guiding Principles, see Enderle (2014).
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general and the respect for human rights in particular (see the
critique of enlightened self-interest above and Greenspan’s
admission in note 3). Third, contributing to public goods is not
just a kind of ‘‘charitable donation’’ (or a ‘‘supererogatory’’
work) to society. Rather, a certain set of public goods (such as
the rule of law and human rights, social customs, technological
knowledge, educational skills, and health conditions) are
actually preconditions to producing private goods. Therefore,
corporations have a moral obligation to recognize these inputs
from society and to ‘‘give back to society’’ their due shares,
including respecting human rights and remedying human
rights violations. In such a way, the understanding of the
wealth of a society as a combination of private and public
wealth can clarify and reinforce corporate responsibility for
human rights.
The social cohesion of our societies is threatened in
multiple ways and at different levels, from the local to the
global level. In this essay, I have attempted to show how
business ethics can make an important, though limited,
contribution to address this challenge. The old, but not less
crucial question of the purpose of business and the econ-
omy can find a new and rich answer that proposes the
creation of wealth in a comprehensive sense, including
natural, economic, human, and social capital and advances
particularly public wealth. Different approaches of what
holds a society together are discussed: enlightened self-
interest, a new game-theoretical approach, and the concept
of the common good advocated by Catholic Social
Teaching. My own proposal is that the creation and
maintenance of public goods provide a solid foundation for
the social cohesion of a society. Guided by the purpose of
wealth creation and the importance of public goods, busi-
ness ethics can unfold a whole program of exciting per-
spectives to strengthen social cohesion by creating wealth
in this comprehensive sense with a special focus on public
wealth. As a more concrete and clearly defined normative
ethical task, I conclude by conceptualizing human rights as
public goods. Indeed, business ethics is facing very new
and exciting challenges.
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